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Abstract
This is a successive oligopoly model with two brands. Each down-
stream …rm chooses one brand to sell on a …nal market. The upstream
…rms specialize in the production of one input speci…cally designed
for the production of one brand, but they also produce the input for
the other brand at an extra cost. We show that when more down-
stream …rms choose one brand, more upstream …rms will specialize in
the input speci…c to that brand, and vice versa. Hence, multiple equi-
libria are possible and the softening e¤ect of brand di¤erentiation on
competition might not be strong enough to induce maximal di¤eren-
tiation. The existence of equilibria and their welfare performance are
also examined.
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11 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Hotelling (1929), the softening e¤ect of prod-
uct di¤erentiation on price competition has been abundantly studied. For
instance, d’Aspremont et al. (1979) establish that …rms choose maximal
di¤erentiation in the linear city model with quadratic transportation costs.
This prediction is echoed in most marketing texts concerning market seg-
mentation, which recommend …rms to di¤erentiate their products.
There exist, however, forces that oppose maximal (or any) product dif-
ferentiation. Following Tirole (1988), these forces can be put into three
categories. A …rst, obvious, category has to do with the absence of price
competition: in some instances, there may exist legal or technical reason why
the scope of price competition is limited. The second category corresponds
to the motto “Be where the demand is”. Although …rms like to di¤erentiate
for strategic purposes, they also all want to locate where the demand is.
If, for example, demand is concentrated around a few poles, one can easily
construct examples in which …rms di¤erentiate but not fully. In a similar
vein, search by consumers may encourage …rms to gather. Finally, the third
category refers to positive externalities that induce …rms to locate near one
another. The now standard classi…cation of Marshallian externalities is be-
tween localization economies (which refer to the bene…ts generated by the
proximity of …rms producing similar goods), and urbanization economies
(which account for all the advantages associated with the overall level of
activity prevailing in a particular area). The general idea is that, for given
inputs, the output of an individual …rm is larger the larger is the aggregate
output of other …rms producing the same good in the same locale.
Regarding the latter category, Helpman and Krugman (1985) point out
that Marshall (1920)’s explanation is incomplete: external economies can
arise from proximity to specialized inputs only if there is a natural com-
parative advantage for the production of these inputs in the region. As
Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) nicely put it, “The puzzle is simply rolled
back to the previous production stage: Why do the producers of inputs
locate in the region?”. They develop therefore the theory that the equi-
librium locations of …rms and their input suppliers are interdependent. So
does Venables (1996) who argues:
“If industries are vertically linked through an input-output structure,
2then the downstream industry forms the market for upstream. Market
access considerations then draw the upstream industry to locations
where there are relatively many downstream …rms. In addition to this
demand linkage between industries, there is also a cost linkage. Firms
in the downstream industry will have lower costs if they locate where
there are relatively many upstream …rms–they save trade costs on their
intermediate inputs. Putting the demand linkage and the cost linkage
together creates a force for the agglomeration of activity in a single
location.”
The present paper shares the intuition of Venables (1996) but departs
from his analysis in one important aspect. Venables is concerned with re-
gional agglomeration and trade, and considers thus physical location of …rms
in di¤erent regions. By contrast, we address the issue of product di¤eren-
tiation, and consider thus location of …rms in a product rather than in a
geographical space. Where Venables considers exogenously di¤erentiated
products which can be sold on two di¤erent geographical markets, we focus
on a single market on which two endogenously di¤erentiated products can
be sold. Our main objective is thus to assess how the softening e¤ect of
product di¤erentiation on competition might be mitigated by the demand
and cost linkages identi…ed by Venables.
Speci…cally, we consider two vertically related industries with the follow-
ing features. The downstream industry produces a …nal product that can be
marketed under two possible di¤erentiated brands. Intuitively, one under-
stands that, absent any other consideration, this industry is driven towards
a situation where …rms split equally (or ‘almost equally’ if there is an odd
number of them) between the two brands in order to soften competition
(this is the translation of maximal di¤erentiation in our setting).
However, this intuition may prove wrong when we also take into account
an upstream industry that produces an essential input for the downstream
industry, and that also has to take its stand on the two brands. The reason is
the following. Although the use of so-called ‡exible manufacturing systems
(FMS) becomes increasingly widespread,1 economies of scale are still present
in many industries. It is thus reasonable to assume that the input is more
1As explained by Norman and Thisse (1999), “the essence of a FMS is that it allows
…rms to customize their products to the requirements of heterogeneous customers at little
or no cost penalty”.
3costly to produce when it has to …t two di¤erentiated brands rather than
a single one. This induces suppliers to select the brand from which they
want to “get closer”. Speci…cally, suppliers will incur speci…c costs to adapt
the intermediate product to the speci…c needs of a single brand of the …nal
product. Nevertheless, such speci…c investment does not completely prevent
them to also conform their input to the other brand: depending on the
demand expressed by the buyers of this other brand, they might indeed …nd
it pro…table to incur the extra cost to serve them. Adopting the terminology
of Eaton and Schmitt (1994), we can say equivalently that upstream …rms
choose to develop one basic product (that …ts one particular brand of the
…nal good), and then produce, with an extra cost, one variation of that
basic product (in order to …t the other brand of the …nal good).2
Reconsidering brand choices by downstream …rms in such a broader con-
text, we can conjecture that these choices will be driven not only by com-
petition on the …nal market, but also by cost considerations linked to the
choices made by …rms in the upstream industry. In particular, downstream
…rms will be more attracted by a brand that a large number of upstream
…rms have chosen to conform with. Since, in turn, upstream …rms are more
likely to conform with a brand that has been selected by a large number
of downstream …rms, we are in the presence of mutually re-enforcing forces
that drive the industries toward an absence of product di¤erentiation.
Our goal is to analyze the balance between these various forces in a simple
static two-stage model where, …rst, …rms in both industries choose simulta-
neously between the two brands and, second, compete on their respective
markets. We show that the number of downstream …rms that choose one
particular brand increases with the number of upstream …rms that specialize
in the input that is speci…c to that brand, and vice versa. This raises the
possibility of multiple equilibria. For instance, it is possible to have an equi-
librium without any di¤erentiation (upstream and downstream …rms select
the same brand), or an equilibrium with maximal di¤erentiation (…rms split
equally between both brands) or an intermediate equilibrium (most–but not
all–upstream and downstream …rms choose the same brand). Depending on
parameters, some of these equilibria are preferred by …rms while the con-
sumer prefer another equilibrium. Hence, there is no clear-cut conclusion to
2This extra cost might be due to the fact that more raw material is needed for each
unit of the input to be transformed into the other brand. It might also be the consequence
of a degradation of performance of the input when it is transformed into the other brand.
4draw for society as a whole, which might end up with excessive or insu¢cient
di¤erentiation.
We see two other possible applications of our setting. First, the extra
cost incurred by the upstream …rms might follow from other sources than the
necessity to physically alter the basic product. It might well be the case that
suppliers face di¤erent costs for serving di¤erent buyers, even though they
sell them exactly the same physical good. For instance, the development
of EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) often induces suppliers to conduct
transactions in di¤erent ways with di¤erent buyers.3 As explained by Ange-
les and Nath (2000), “with the movement towards more integrated and agile
‘extended enterprises’, hub …rms (i.e. …rms that initiate EDI linkages) have
been forced to provide incentives to their suppliers to make non-contractible
investments in information sharing, quality initiatives, and innovation to
enable them to ful…ll the requirements of more tightly connected and inte-
grated information networks.” Similarly, case studies in Marcussen (1996)
show that EDI capability in‡uences the buying decision about which up-
stream …rms will be ‘in suppliers’ (currently chosen suppliers) — and which
of the ‘in suppliers’ will get orders for speci…c items. “If two leading compet-
ing suppliers both develop EDI capability, competitive parity between the
two …rms is maintained. However, the EDI capable ‘in suppliers’ stand to
win at the expense of both the ‘in suppliers’ without EDI capability and the
‘out suppliers”’. Since EDI requirements often di¤er from one downstream
…rm to another, suppliers willing to trade with di¤erent buyers face the same
type of costs as the ones described above.
Second, the issue we address in this paper can also be related to the
literature considering mix-and-match and system goods. As de…ned by Ein-
horn (1992), “mix-and-match compatible technologies are systems of inter-
connected goods that may incorporate di¤erent components from di¤erent
manufacturers”. Examples abound, e.g., in the computer and in the con-
sumer electronics industries. Some papers in this literature consider indus-
tries where each …rm sells every component of a complete system.4 Other
papers consider instead that …rms specialize in the production of a single
component, an assumption that comes closer to the issue at stake here (we
3EDI is the direct computer-to-computer exchange of information stored in standard
formatted business documents, such as invoices, bills of lading, purchase orders, etc.,
among …rms.
4See,e.g., Matutes and Régibeau (1988, 1992), Economides (1989).
5can indeed interpret our intermediate and …nal products as complementary
components forming a system good). Although the papers in this second
strand of the literature focus on di¤erent issues than ours (and make quite
di¤erent assumptions about, notably, consumer preferences and ‘compati-
bility’ costs), they share our concern for analyzing the “location” decisions
of the ‘software’ …rms (the upstream …rms in our terminology).5 However,
it must be stressed that they leave aside the “location” decisions of the
‘hardware’ (or downstream) …rms and, therefore, abstract away our main
question about how the decisions of both types of …rms a¤ect each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
modelling framework. Section 3 draws some intuition from two simple mod-
els where costs are taken as exogenous. Section 4 analyzes the general two-
stage game and presents our main results. Section 5 collects some welfare
considerations. Section 6 concludes and proposes some directions for further
research.
2 The model
The model is a successive oligopoly model with two adjacent industries. In
the downstream industry, a set N of n …rms produce some product to be sold
on a …nal market. They all have to choose under which brand to market
this product. Two horizontally di¤erentiated brands, noted a and b, are
available. Once the …rms have made their choice, the industry is partitioned
into the two subsets Na and Nb (Na \ Nb = ;;Na [ Nb = N). We adopt
the following notation. Let yik denote the quantity of brand k (k = a;b)
produced by some downstream …rm i (i = 1;::: ;n), Yk ´
P
i2Nk yik, the




Within the existing theory, there are two basic approaches to model hor-
izontal di¤erentiation. On the one hand, the spatial models–such as the
5For instance, Matutes and Régibeau (1989) analyze the situation where two …rms
sell one component (e.g., software) of a two-component system, and where consumers
have already bought the …rst component (e.g., the personal computer) so that several
independent markets for software are created. Firms have thus to choose the market(s)
that they will serve. They also decide whether to produce di¤erent software for each
market or to sell software that can be used with both types of computers. Church and
Gandal (1992) develop a model where there are two incompatible hardware technologies,
an endogenously determined number of software …rms, and consumers who value software
variety; they investigate the decision of a software …rm concerning which network to join.
6Hotelling’s linear city and Salop’s circular city models–generate market de-
mands by integrating over consumers with di¤erent tastes. On the other
hand, the models in the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz tradition derive a demand
system for di¤erentiated products from the utility function of a represen-
tative consumer with a taste for variety.6 Because the …rst approach is
based on a rather simplistic description of individual demand (consumers
are assumed to buy at most one unit of the product), it proves ill-suited to
incorporate demand and cost linkages. We thus favor the second approach
and use a system of demand functions for di¤erentiated products derived
from the quadratic, separable utility function of a representative consumer,
as in Shubik (1980, Chapter 7) or in Singh and Vives (1984). Accordingly,
we write the inverse demand schedule as follows:7
² when the n downstream …rms choose to produce the same brand k
(meaning that Nk = N and that the other brand is not produced),
price on the market for brand k is given by pk = 1 ¡ Yk;
² when the downstream …rms choose to produce di¤erent brands, prices
on the market are given by pa = 1 ¡ Ya ¡ °Yb and pb = 1 ¡ Yb ¡ °Ya
in the region of quantities where prices are positive, where 0 · ° < 1
is the degree of di¤erentiation between brands a and b.
We assume that the downstream …rms produce the …nal product by
transforming a single intermediate good on a one-for-one basis. The marginal
cost of the downstream …rms only consists of the price paid for the interme-
diate good (other speci…c costs are assumed to be zero).
The intermediate good is supplied by the upstream industry, which con-
sists of a set M of m …rms. The production technology for the intermediate
good assumes some degree of ‘brand speci…city’. That is, each upstream
…rm has to design its production process in conformity with a speci…c brand
of the …nal product (we say in the sequel that they choose to “produce for”
brand a or for brand b). As a result, if the intermediate good is to be trans-
formed into that speci…c brand, the marginal cost of production is equal to
6For a recent discussion of these two approaches (and the presentation of a novel
integrative approach), see Anderson and de Palma (2000).
7The inverse demand schedule is derived from the quadratic utility function of a repre-
sentative consumer which exhibits love for variety; for the exact derivation, see the proof
of Proposition 7 in the appendix.
7c, whereas if it has to be transformed into the other brand, an extra ‘adap-
tation’ cost t is to be incurred, and the total marginal cost of production
amounts to c + t (naturally, we assume c + t < 1 to avoid no trade situ-
ations).8 In the sequel, without any loss of generality, we set c = 0: For
the sake of simplicity, we also assume that both industries count an even
number of …rms (in Subsection 4.4, we discuss how an odd number of …rms
in either industry a¤ects our main results).
We study a dynamic game where location decisions (which brand to pro-
duce, or to design the intermediate good for?) precede production decisions
(how much of the intermediate and the …nal goods to produce?). Regarding
production decisions, we assume a sequential Cournot competition in which
upstream …rms decide before downstream …rms, the price of the intermedi-
ate good being obtained by equating supply to demand. Regarding brand
choices, we assume simultaneous decisions by upstream and downstream
…rms. The game is solved for its subgame-perfect equilibria by the method
of backward induction.
Although the modelling framework has been kept as simple as possible,
the dynamic game is rather intricate to solve. Therefore, to shed some light
on the various forces at play, we shall …rst focus on the downstream industry
and analyze two simple models where costs are taken as exogenous. This
will allow us to better grasp how downstream decisions are a¤ected by the
endogeneization of costs through the upstream brand choices.
3 Brand choices with exogenous costs
We start with the second-stage production decisions. Suppose that the two
brands have been adopted by a positive number of …rms. Typical …rms
i 2 Na and j 2 Nb respectively face the following maximization programs:
8A concrete example that …ts our assumptions is what Levitt (1980) reports about a
speci…c type of steel, the so-called ‘No. 302, 72-inch, hot-rolled strip’. “Not all generic
products are the same. (...) Because of slight di¤erences among automobile company
manufacturing processes, one supplier’s “302” may, in fact, be “better” than another’s.
One mill’s 302 may take certain coatings more easily or quickly than another’s. One
supplier may …ll orders from a single mill, and another from several. In the latter case,
the sheen or hue of the generic product may vary slightly from mill to mill, which makes




i = (1 ¡ yia ¡Y ¡i




j = (1 ¡ yjb ¡Y
¡j
b ¡ °Ya)yjb ¡ wbyjb,
where wa and wb are the prices of the intermediate input to be transformed
in either brand a or b. For the moment, we assume that these prices are
constant.
The …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization yield the following
reaction functions: yia = (1=2)(1 ¡ wa ¡ Y ¡i
a ¡ °Yb) and yjb = (1=2)(1 ¡
wb ¡ Y
¡j
b ¡°Ya): Solving this system and using the symmetric positions of
…rms within each market, we derive the equilibrium quantities. To simplify
the exposition, we identify a partition of the …rms to ¢n ´ na ¡ nb where
nk = #Nk; k = a;b. For a given ¢n inherited from the …rst stage, every
i 2 Na produce a quantity ya(¢n); and every j 2 Nb a quantity yb(¢n):
ya(¢n) = 2
(n ¡ ¢n + 2)(1 ¡ wa) ¡°(n ¡ ¢n)(1 ¡ wb)




(n + ¢n + 2)(1 ¡ wb) ¡ °(n + ¢n)(1 ¡ wa)
4(n + 1) + (1 ¡°2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n)
: (2)
In the case where all …rms adopt the same brand (say brand a), we set
¢n = n in expression (1) and disregard expression (2).9 Equilibrium pro…ts






Let us now turn to the …rst stage of the game where …rms simultaneously
choose which brand they want to produce. In this game, a Nash equilibrium
with ¢n 6= §n is characterized by two conditions, ensuring that no …rm …nds





a(¢n + 2). A Nash equilibrium with ¢n = n (resp.
¢n = ¡n) satis…es (Da) (resp. (Db)) only. We develop these conditions
in two speci…c examples.
3.1 Constant and identical costs
In the …rst example, we assume that all …rms face the same marginal cost,
whatever their choice of brand. For wa = wb = w; conditions (Da) and (Db)
9We suppose that parameter values are such that equilibrium quantities are positive
for all ¢n (this issue is analyzed rigorously in the general setting).
9can respectively be rewritten as
(
(Da) ¡(¢n ¡ 1)
£
4(n ¡ °) + (1 ¡°2)(n ¡ ¢n)(n + ¢n ¡ 2)
¤
¸ 0;
(Db) ¡ (¡¢n ¡ 1)
£
4(n ¡ °) + (1 ¡°2)(n + ¢n)(n ¡¢n ¡ 2)
¤
¸ 0:
Because condition (Da) [resp. (Db)] is valid for ¡n < ¢n · n [resp.
¡n · ¢n < n], it is clear that the two bracketed terms are strictly pos-
itive, meaning that the two conditions boil down to ¡1 · ¢n · 1. In
words, when all downstream …rms face the same cost of production, the
unique brand choice equilibrium is where …rms split equally between the two
brands (¢n = 0).10 The intuition is simple: when the split is unequal, …rms
on the ‘larger’ market have an incentive to move to the ‘smaller’ market
where competition is softer.
3.2 Exogenous Marshallian externalities
In the second example, we introduce exogenous Marshallian externalities of
the following linear form: wk = w¡µnk, with 0 < µ < w=n, and k = a;b: We
assume thus that the marginal cost of producing some brand decreases lin-
early with the number of …rms producing that particular brand (see Section
1 for justi…cations of such assumption). In this case, we can use expressions
(1) and (2) to develop conditions (Da) and (Db) as follows:
(
(Da) (¢n ¡ 1)[µ(1 + °n) ¡ (1 ¡ °)(1 ¡w)]-(¢n) ¸ 0
(Db) (¢n + 1)[µ(1 + °n) ¡(1 ¡ °)(1 ¡ w)]-(¢n + 2) · 0;
where -(¢n) =
£
(n(1 ¡ °) + 2)(n(1 + °) ¡ 2°) ¡ (1 ¡ °2)¢n(¢n ¡ 2)
¤
: It
can be shown that -(¢n) > 0, for all ¡n + 2 · ¢n · n.11 There are
therefore two cases to consider according to the intensity of the Marshallian
externalities. We de…ne the following threshold: ¹ µ ´ (1¡°)(1¡w)=(1+°n):
1. For weak Marshallian externalities (µ · ¹ µ), conditions (Da) and (Db)
boil down to ¡1 · ¢n · 1, meaning that the previous conclusion
carries over: equal split is the unique brand choice equilibrium.
10When n is odd, there are two equilibria, ¢n = 1 and ¢n = ¡1, which correspond to
an ‘almost equal’ split of the set of …rms (see Subsection 4.4 for more on this issue).
11See the proof of Lemma 1 in the Appendix.
102. For strong Marshallian externalities (µ > ¹ µ), conditions (Da) and (Db)
cannot hold at the same time. There is thus no brand choice equilib-
rium where the two brands are both chosen by a positive number of
…rms. The only equilibria are where all …rms choose the same brand.
Again, the intuition is simple: when Marshallian externalities are strong
enough, they overcome the competitive attractiveness of the ‘smaller’ market
and drive the industry towards concentration on a single brand.
4 Brand choices with endogenous costs
We now explicitly consider the upstream industry in order to endogenize
the downstream input costs. Using the downstream reaction functions de-
rived above, we obtain the inverse demands for the intermediate good to be
transformed in each brand:
wa = 1 ¡
n + ¢n + 2
n + ¢n
Ya ¡ °Yb, (3)
wb = 1 ¡
n ¡ ¢n + 2
n ¡ ¢n
Yb ¡ °Ya. (4)
When a single brand is adopted by all downstream …rms (say brand
k), we can use the above analysis to express the inverse demand for the
intermediate good to be transformed in brand k as wk = 1 ¡ n+1
n Yk:
4.1 Upstream …rms’ decisions
Let us consider the case where the two brands have been selected by a
positive number of downstream and upstream …rms. Since upstream …rms
have the opportunity to produce the intermediate input for either brand, we
need a slightly di¤erent notation. Let the upstream industry be partitioned
into the two subsets Ma and Mb (Ma \ Mb = ;;Ma [ Mb = M) according
to the …rms’ brand choices. Let xik denote the quantity of the intermediate
good produced by the upstream …rm i (i = 1;::: ;m) to be transformed into
brand k (k = a;b), and let the total quantity, Xk, of the intermediate good
to be transformed into brand k be de…ned as







11Because of the linear technology in the downstream industry, we have
the following market clearing conditions: Ya = Xa and Yb = Xb: Using the
latter conditions and expressions (3) and (4), we can write the upstream
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A similar expression obtains for the pro…t ¦u
j of a typical …rm j 2 Mb.
Maximizing ¦u
i with respect to xia and xib, and ¦u
j with respect to
xja and xjb, we get a system of four …rst-order conditions that we solve
using the symmetry of the model (at the symmetric equilibrium, we have
xia = xaa and xib = xab, 8i 2 Ma, and xja = xba and xjb = xbb, 8j 2 Mb).
Accordingly, we get the following interior solutions (with ¢m ´ ma ¡ mb):
xaa(¢n;¢m) =
(n + ¢n)(n ¡ ¢n + 2)[2 + (m ¡ ¢m)t]




n)[2 ¡ (m ¡¢m + 2)t]




(n ¡ ¢n)(n + ¢n + 2)[2 ¡ (m ¡ ¢m + 2)t]




n)[2 +(m ¡ ¢m)t]
2(m +1)[4(n + 1) + (1 ¡ °2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n)]
;
xba(¢n;¢m) = xab(¡¢n;¡¢m); and xbb(¢n;¢m) = xaa(¡¢n;¡¢m):
This interior solution holds provided that xab and xba are both non-
negative, i.e., provided that t is not too large. It is indeed clear that the
upstream …rms will only …nd it pro…table to produce for the other brand
than the one they have chosen provided that t is low enough. Formally, xab ¸
0 , t · ^ tab(¢n;¢m);and xba ¸ 0 , t · ^ tba(¢n;¢m) = ^ tab(¡¢n;¡¢m):
We have that ^ tab decreases with ¢n and increases with ¢m. We wish to
focus on situations where the interior solution holds (i.e., where all upstream
…rms …nd it pro…table to produce the intermediate good for the two brands)
whatever the brand choices made in the two industries at the …rst stage of
the game. A su¢cient condition for this to be true is
(INT) t ·
n(1 ¡ °) + °
n + m[n(1 + °) ¡ °]
:
12We assume that this condition is met throughout the rest of the paper which
proves particularly useful for speci…cation of equilibria in the …rst stage (we
discuss the raison d’être of this assumption in Subsection 4.4).
4.2 Equilibrium pro…ts
Because of the market clearing conditions and of the symmetry of the down-
stream …rms, we have ya = (1=na)(maxaa+mbxba) and yb = (1=nb)(maxab+
mbxbb): Plugging the latter expressions into (3) and (4), we get the equilib-
rium prices for the intermediate input to be transformed in the two brand:
wa (¢m) =
2 + (m ¡ ¢m)t
2(m +1)
and wb (¢m) = wa(¡¢m):
Not surprisingly, we observe that wa T wb , ¢m S 0, and that the dif-
ference (wa ¡ wb) decreases with ¢m. In other words, the more upstream
…rms select some brand, the cheaper the input to be transformed into that
brand. Substituting the input prices into expressions (1) and (2), we obtain
the equilibrium quantities for the downstream …rms as:
ya(¢n;¢m) =
(n ¡ ¢n +2)[m(2 ¡ t) + ¢mt]
2(m + 1)[4(n + 1) + (1 ¡ °2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n)]
¡
°(n ¡ ¢n)[m(2 ¡ t) ¡ ¢mt]
2(m + 1)[4(n +1) + (1 ¡ °2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n)]
; (5)










(n + ¢n)(n ¡ ¢n + 2)[2 ¡ (m ¡¢m)t]
2
2(m + 1)
2[4(n + 1) + (1 ¡ °2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n)]
+
(n ¡ ¢n)(n + ¢n + 2)[2 ¡ (m ¡ ¢m + 1)t]
2
2(m + 1)




n)[2 ¡ (m ¡ ¢m)t][2 ¡ (m ¡ ¢m + 1)t]
2(m + 1)






As far as Condition (INT) holds, the previous expressions are easily
used to describe limit cases where all …rms in some industry select the same
13brand. We have thus all necessary elements at our disposal to analyze the
…rst-stage brand choices in the two industries.
Before considering the general framework in depth, let us quickly relate it
to the two special cases analyzed above. First, if we set t = 0 in the general
setting, we come back to the …rst special case where wa = wb. Second,
exogenous Marshallian externalities can be obtained in the general setting
by making the following assumptions: (i) m = xn, where x is an integer
larger than or equal to 1, (ii) each downstream …rm can dictate its choice of
brand to a separate set of x upstream …rms. These assumptions imply that
¢m = x¢n. As a result, some manipulations allow to rewrite wa (¢m) as
w ¡ µna, with w = (1 + xnt)=(xn + 1) and µ = (xt)=(xn +1).
In these two special cases, downstream …rms are either splitting equally
or concentrating on a single brand. We want now to investigate whether
the set of equilibria expands when upstream …rms are free to choose the
brand they want to produce for, and when the adaptation cost t is positive
(although small enough for Condition (INT) to hold). The answer to this
question will be shown to depend on the balance between the following two
con‡icting forces. On the one hand, downstream …rms have an incentive to
choose di¤erent brands in order to soften competition on the …nal market;
stability then requires that they split equally between the two brands. On
the other hand, brand choices also determine the relative price of the input;
this second force drives downstream …rms to model their behavior on that
of the upstream …rms. Since upstream …rms tend to do exactly the same,
this force drives the market towards unanimous adoption of a single brand.
In what follows, we look for Nash equilibria in the brand choice game,
i.e., for partitions of the two sets of …rms such that no …rm–either upstream
or downstream–has an incentive to unilaterally switch brands. We establish
the existence of a Nash equilibrium and draw instructive results about the
characterization of the set of Nash equilibria.
4.3 Existence and characterization of equilibria
The brand choice game might lead to two typical industry patterns: either no
industry is concentrated on a single brand (a pattern referred to hereafter
as dispersion), or all …rms in at least one industry decide to adopt the
same brand (a pattern referred to hereafter as concentration, with complete
concentration denoting the situation where …rms in both industries adopt
14the same brand).
When there is dispersion (j¢nj < n and j¢mj < m), four conditions
have to be met to guarantee a Nash equilibrium: no downstream …rm …nds
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Using the expressions of second-stage equilibrium pro…ts, we can develop
the latter four conditions as follows (with t > 0):
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n)(1 +°)
.
The same set of conditions applies to analyze situations of concentration,
except that one or the other condition will become irrelevant.12
To establish the existence of an equilibrium and characterize the set of
possible equilibria, we need to examine closely the two functions ª(¢n) and
©(¢n): The next lemma summarizes their useful properties. The proofs of
this lemma and of all subsequent propositions are relegated to Section 7.
Lemma 1 (i) For all ¡n · ¢n · n, ª(¢n) = ¡ª(¡¢n).
(ii) For all ¡n · ¢n · n ¡2, ©(¢n + 2) = ¡©(¡¢n):
(iii) For all ¡n · ¢n · n ¡ 2, ª(¢n + 2) > ª(¢n):
(iv) ©(¢n) ¸ 0 has the sign of (¢n ¡ 1):
(v) For all ¡n + 2 · ¢n · n ¡ 2, ©(¢n + 2) > ©(¢n).
12For instance, for the situation of global concentration on brand a to be an equilibrium,
only conditions (Ua) and (Da), with ¢m = m and ¢n = n; have to be met.
15The …rst two statements are a direct consequence of the symmetry of
the model. They imply that if conditions (Ua), (Ub), (Da), and (Db) are
met for ¢m = x and ¢n = y, they are also met for ¢m = ¡x and ¢n =
¡y. Next, we learn from statement (iv) that for ¢n > 0 (resp. < 0),
conditions (Da) and (Db) require that ¢m be comprised between two non-
negative (resp. non-positive) bounds; this implies that it is impossible to
have a brand choice equilibrium where some particular brand is chosen by
a majority of downstream …rms and a minority of upstream …rms (or vice
versa). Moreover, statements (iii) and (v) imply that in equilibrium, larger
values of ¢m necessarily correspond to larger values of ¢n and vice versa.
Finally, ©(0) = ¡©(2) < 0 means that conditions (Da) and (Db) impose
no restriction on the sign of ¢m in that particular case; however, using
conditions (Ua) and (Ub), we see that if downstream …rms split equally
between the two brands (¢n = 0), the only possible equilibrium is where
upstream …rms also split equally (¢m = 0) between the two brands.
We have thus established two important characterization results about
possible equilibria in the brand choice game. They are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 (i) Candidate equilibria are located in the North-East quad-
rant of the (¢m;¢n) grid (with mirror-equilibria in the South-West quad-
rant). (ii) If equilibria coexist, they can be ranked in the sense that larger
values of ¢n correspond to larger values of ¢m.
Building on Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, we can now prove existence of
an equilibrium in the brand choice game, as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For all parameter values satisfying Condition (INT), there
exists at least one Nash equilibrium in the …rst-stage brand choice game.
The proof of Proposition exploits the following two …ndings: (i) for every
¢m, there is a unique value of ¢n such that no downstream …rm …nds it prof-
itable to deviate, and (ii) the so-de…ned function of ¢m is non-decreasing.
The rest of the proof consists in showing that the latter function admits at
least one …xed point.
Now that we have established the existence of equilibrium and excluded
a whole category of industry partitions as possible equilibria (namely the
North-West and South-East quadrants of the (¢m;¢n) grid), we would
16like to better characterize equilibria according to the values of the two key
parameters t and °. This task is relatively easy in two special cases, namely
concentration and equal split of one or the other industry. The next two
propositions record our results in these two cases.
Proposition 4 Suppose Condition (INT) is met. (i) Global concentration
is a brand choice equilibrium provided that, for a given degree of product dif-
ferentiation °, the adaptation cost t is large enough. More precisely, we need
t ¸ ¹ t(°;n) ´ [(n ¡ 1)(n ¡ °)(1 ¡ °)]=[n(n + 1)]: (ii) If the downstream in-
dustry is concentrated, the only possible equilibrium is where the upstream
industry is concentrated as well. The reverse is not true.
Note that ¹ t(°;n) is a decreasing function of °, meaning that the more
brands are di¤erentiated (or the lower °) the narrower the range of adap-
tation costs (t) supporting global concentration as an equilibrium. The
intuition for this result is as follows. When brand di¤erentiation increases,
downstream …rms have a higher incentive to choose di¤erent brands in or-
der to soften competition on the …nal market. The counterweight lies in the
higher input cost that would result from such a move and it clearly increases
with t. It can also be checked that ¹ t(°;n) is an increasing function of n (and
the intuition is similar to the previous one). Finally, noteworthy is the fact
that ¹ t(°;n) does not depend on m, the size of the upstream industry.
Proposition 5 Suppose Condition (INT) is met. When both industries
count an even number of …rms, equal splitting (¢m = ¢n = 0) is a brand
choice equilibrium for all admissible values of t and °. There is no other
equilibrium with either ¢m = 0 or ¢n = 0:
Proposition 5 tells us that when both industries count an even number
of …rms, equal split in one industry calls for equal split in the other industry
as well.
Unfortunately, except for the two previous cases, the complex form of
the four conditions for equilibrium makes it impossible to explicitly char-
acterize the set of equilibria according to the parameter values. However,
we know from the above two propositions that multiple equilibria might oc-
cur (with m and n even, equal split is an equilibrium for all t and °, and
global concentration is an equilibrium for t ¸ ¹ t(n;°)). Moreover, numerical
simulations allow us to ascertain the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
17Take, for instance, m = n = 10; ° = 0:95; and t = 0:007: We have then an
equilibrium with ¢m = 6 and ¢n = 2. The next proposition records this
important result.
Proposition 6 There exist constellations of parameters for which the brand
choice equilibrium involves an unequal dispersion of …rms in both industries.
4.4 Discussion
We brie‡y discuss here the raison d’être of Condition (INT), as well as the
case of an odd number of …rms in one or the other industry.
The raison d’être of Condition (INT) is best understood by considering
what happens when it does not hold for all ° and t. In such a case, the
upstream …rms that have selected brand a (resp. brand b) can produce for
brand a and brand b, or for brand a only (resp. brand b only). There
are thus four possible scenarios according to whether …rms of each type
produce either for both brands or for a single one. In contrast, if Condition
(INT) holds, both types of upstream …rms produce for both brands. As we
have seen, the method used to check if (¢n;¢m) is an equilibrium consists
of comparing the pro…ts made by each upstream …rm at (¢n;¢m) to the
pro…ts made at (¢n;¢m ¡ 2) (when one upstream that had selected brand
a switches to brand b) and to the pro…ts made at (¢n;¢m + 2) (when one
upstream that had selected brand b switches to brand a). On the one hand,
when Condition (INT) does not hold for all ° and t, there are four possible
expressions for the pro…ts at (¢n;¢m), four other at (¢n;¢m ¡ 2) and
again four at (¢n;¢m + 2). There are thus 64 comparisons to make. On
the other hand, when Condition (INT) holds, only two comparisons remain.
As demonstrated above, the analysis is still analytically di¢cult to handle
even with only two comparisons. This provides a practical vindication for
our assumption. Referring to the motivation given in Section 1, we could
also say that the FMS used in the upstream industry guarantees that t be
kept low enough whatever the market conditions.
Because brand choices by individual …rms have a discrete impact in our
model, it is not surprising that slightly di¤erent results obtain when one or
the other industry counts an odd number of …rms. In particular, it can be
shown that if at least one industry counts an odd number of …rms, ‘almost’
equal splitting (¢m, ¢n 2 f0;1g) might not be an equilibrium for some
values of ° and t. (Yet, it can also be shown that this becomes less likely
18as the number of …rms in the “odd” industry increases). The reason is
that, because of the link between the two industries, the slight imbalance
of the partition in the “odd” industry might make equal split unstable in
the “even” industry. Fortunately, our results about the existence of an
equilibrium, the characterization of equilibria with concentration, and the
possibility of asymmetric equilibria hold independently of whether industries
count an even or an odd number of …rms.
5 Welfare considerations
We de…ne total welfare as the sum of three elements: (i) total pro…ts in the
upstream industry, (ii) total pro…ts in the downstream industry, and (iii) the
consumer surplus. Before stating our results for the general setting, let us
draw some insights from our two special cases with exogenous costs. When
costs are constant and identical, it can be shown that private and social
incentives coincide everywhere: equal split is the unique equilibrium and it
maximizes total welfare. Noteworthy is the fact that while the consumer
unambiguously prefers equal split over any other partition (because it pro-
vides her with the variety she loves at the relatively low cost of a reduced
but balanced competition), the downstream industry as a whole might pre-
fer some unequal partition (e.g., for n = 6 and ° = 0, ¦d(2) > ¦d(0)). The
addition of an agglomeration force (Marshallian externalities) is a source of
possible divergence between private and social incentives. It is also a source
of complexity in the welfare analysis. One important result emerges, how-
ever, from the second special case: equal split leads to a higher total welfare
than concentration provided that µ be lower than some threshold ^ µ; which
is itself smaller than ¹ µ (i.e., the value of µ under which equal split is an
equilibrium). This means that the market might yield excessive dispersion
from a social point of view.13
When downstream costs are endogenized through the upstream choices,
additional sources of market ine¢ciency appear. Not surprisingly, the same
di¢culties that we encounter for the characterization of the set of equilibria
impede any exhaustive welfare analysis. In particular, taking the point of
view of a second-best regulator, we are unable to determine the partition of
the two industries that maximizes total welfare for a given set of parameters.
13The proofs for the statement can be obtained from the authors upon request.
19The di¢culty (revealed by numerical simulations) comes from the fact that
total welfare might well reach its highest value for asymmetric partitions of
the two industries (be they equilibria or not). Nevertheless, some instructive
results can be drawn from the comparison of global concentration and equal
split, where expressions are easier to handle. Such comparison makes perfect
sense when m and n are even. Indeed, we know that equal split and global
concentration will be equilibria simultaneously for t ¸ ¹ t(n;°). We might
therefore wonder whether the di¤erent agents and society as a whole have
a clear preference for one or the other equilibrium. The next proposition
records our results.
Proposition 7 Suppose m and n even. Call S the set of parameters where
global concentration and equal split are equilibria simultaneously. The set of
parameters where the representative consumer prefers global concentration
to equal split includes S, whereas the set of parameters where (downstream
and upstream) …rms prefer global concentration to equal split is included in
S. Ambiguous results obtain for society as a whole.
The intuition for Proposition 7 can be explained as follows. For the rep-
resentative consumer, the advantage of equal split is brand variety, but the
disadvantage is higher prices because of higher input costs. In other words,
the consumer will prefer total concentration to equal split provided that t be
large enough for a given °. It turns out that an even larger value of t is re-
quired for the …rms not to deviate from total concentration. Therefore, when
total concentration is an equilibrium, the consumer unambiguously prefers
it to equal split. Regarding downstream …rms, equal split leads to softer
competition but higher input costs than total concentration. However, for
a given °, the lowest value of t that induces the downstream industry, as a
whole, to favor total concentration is larger than the one that prevents indi-
vidual deviations from total concentration. Accordingly, total concentration
being an equilibrium does not imply that the downstream industry prefers
it to equal split. The same conclusion applies for the upstream industry, yet
for other reasons. On the one hand, we have shown that upstream …rms
do not wish to deviate from total concentration as long as the downstream
industry is concentrated. On the other hand, the demand for the …nal good–
and hence for the input–decreases with ° which explains why upstream …rms
favor equal split unless both t and ° are high enough. It turns out that the
set of parameters where the latter is true is included in S.
20In sum, the interests of the consumer are at odds with those of the …rms,
which justi…es that there is no clear cut conclusion for society as a whole:
when total concentration and equal split are both equilibria, the ranking of
their welfare performance depends on the values of the parameters. In other
words, when total concentration is an option, the second-best regulator does
not necessarily prefer it to equal split.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the softening e¤ect of product di¤eren-
tiation on price competition in a model of successive oligopolies with two
brands. Downstream …rms select the brand that they sell on a …nal market.
Each upstream …rm specializes in the production of one input speci…cally
designed for the production of one brand in the downstream industry. They
incur an extra cost when they produce for the other brand.
We have shown that the larger is the number of downstream …rms that
select one brand, the larger is the number of upstream …rms that specialize
in the input speci…c to that brand, and vice versa. Hence, downstream
…rms faces the following trade-o¤. By selecting the brand that is the less
popular among downstream …rms, they soften the competition and therefore
increase their pro…ts. This is the e¤ect that is emphasized in the economics
and marketing literature. However, this choice is also associated with a low
pool of suppliers and high input costs, which decreases pro…ts. This e¤ect
is similar to the ‘cost linkage’ identi…ed in the new economic geography
literature (see e.g. Venables (1996)). This paper shares this e¤ect with that
literature but examines the location of …rms in a product rather than in a
geographical space.
We have proved that there exists always at least one equilibrium in the
brand choice game. Multiple equilibria might also occur. We have examined
in details two prominent equilibrium candidates, namely concentration and
equal split. In the …rst case, downstream and upstream …rms are unanimous
to choose a single brand: there is no product di¤erentiation. This is an
equilibrium provided that the extra cost of adapting one input designed for
one brand to the other brand is large enough. In the second case, half (or half
plus or minus one) downstream and upstream …rms choose one brand, the
other half choose the other brand. This maximal di¤erentiation situation is
21always an equilibrium when there is an even number of …rms in each industry.
We have also shown that other equilibria without maximal di¤erentiation
might also exist. Finally, we have examined the welfare performance of
these equilibria. This is unfortunately not an easy task and there is no
clear-cut conclusion to draw as a whole. However, we have established that
the interests of the consumer are at odds with those of the …rms.
The model developed in this paper has been kept as simple as possible
in order to highlight the interplay between the brand choices in the two
vertically linked industries. Despite the relative simplicity of our two stage-
game, we have not been able to fully characterize the set of its equilibria,
nor to gauge their welfare performance. More than an acknowledgment of
partial failure, we have here a clear demonstration of the complexity and
signi…cance of the strategic interaction addressed in the model. We believe
this should fuel further research on the topic, and we suggest therefore some
extensions of the model. It might indeed be the case that some more insights
would be gained in a slightly richer model.
A …rst extension would be to endogenize the degree of product di¤er-
entiation between the two brands of the …nal product. We could assume
that the downstream …rms have the opportunity to invest in some technol-
ogy that allows them to increase product di¤erentiation. As in Lambertini
and Rossini (1998) or in Belle‡amme (2000), we would then express ° as a
decreasing function of the number of …rms investing in this technology; it
seems indeed natural to suppose that brands become more di¤erentiated as
more …rms invest in di¤erentiation.
A second extension would be to make the adaptation cost t depend on
the degree of product di¤erentiation °. It seems indeed more natural to
assume that this adaptation cost becomes larger the more the brands of the
…nal product are di¤erentiated.
The last two directions for further research seem more far-reaching. On
the one hand, it might be worth investigating the possibility of vertical
arrangements between downstream and upstream …rms (e.g., vertical inte-
gration, formation of ‘production networks’, or more generally, all forms of
“supply chain management”, as it is called in the business literature). On
the other hand, we could let downstream …rms produce the two di¤erenti-
ated brands if they wish to (in other words, downstream …rms would have
access to the same type of ‡exible manufacturing systems as upstream …rms
22are supposed to use). The decision to produce another brand (or other
brands) in addition to the initial one can be seen as a movement towards
mass customisation (i.e., the provision of such a variety of products that
nearly everyone can …nd what they want). But customisation is likely to
increase production costs in a similar way as in our model. As Alford et
al. (2000) report about the automotive industry, “The desire to o¤er cus-
tomers numerous choices of appearance, performance, comfort, safety and
security is at the expense of escalating complexity and cost in assembly and
the supply chain.”14
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of statements (i), (ii), and (iii) are
straightforward. Statements (iv) and (v) are less obvious. Let us adopt
the following notation. Let A ´ [n(1 ¡ °) + 2]; B ´ [n(1 + °) ¡ 2°]; C ´
(1 ¡ °2); D ´ [n(1 + °) + 2]; E ´
£
(1 ¡ °2)n2 + (3 + °2)n ¡2°(1 ¡ °)
¤
;
and F ´ [3 + ° + n(1 +°)]; which are all strictly positive for ° < 1:
We have thus that ©(¢n) ¸ 0 if and only if
(¢n ¡ 1)[AB ¡ C¢n (¢n ¡ 2)]
DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n ¡ 2)
> 0.
The two terms [AB ¡ C¢n (¢n ¡ 2)] and [DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n ¡ 2)] de…ne
parabolas in ¢n with a maximum at ¢n = 0 (1) if n is even (odd). It is thus
easily seen that both terms reach their lowest possible value at ¢n = n or
¢n = ¡n+2; i.e., respectively, 4(n¡°) and 4(1+°)n2+4(3¡°2)n¡4°(1¡°):
The former term is clearly strictly positive; the latter term increases with n
and reaches thus is lowest value for n = 2; which is 4[10 + °(3 ¡ °)] > 0: It
follows that ©(¢n) has the sign of (¢n ¡ 1) which proves statement (iv).
Regarding statement (v), we have that ©(¢n + 2) > ©(¢n) if and only
14Similarly, Fisher (1997) quotes the experience of the Japanese …rm National Bicycle to
illustrate that mass customization is not necessarily cheap: “National’s custom production
requires three times more labor than assembly-line production of bikes.”
23if
(¢n + 1)[AB ¡ C¢n (¢n + 2)]
DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n + 2)
>
(¢n ¡ 1)[AB ¡ C¢n (¢n ¡ 2)]





n + C(ABF ¡3DE ¡ 4CF)¢2
n + ABDE
¤






[DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n + 2)][DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n ¡ 2)]
> 0,




(1 ¡ °2)(n2 ¡ ¢2
n) + 4(n + 1)
¤
< 0, we have that ©(¢n +2) > ©(¢n) ,




[DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n + 2)][DE ¡ CF¢n (¢n ¡ 2)]
.
Since -(¢n) = -(¡¢n), we can focus, without loss of generality on ¢n ¸ 0.
Now, it is easy to see the following. (1) For ¢n ¸ 0, DE¡CF¢n (¢n ¡ 2) >
DE¡CF¢n (¢n + 2): (2) The term DE¡CF¢n (¢n + 2) reaches its lowest
value for ¢n = n¡2, which is equal to 4(1+°)n2+4(3¡°2)n¡4°(1¡°) > 0
for all ° 2 [0;1] and n ¸ 2. (3) The term BE¡CF¢2
n also reaches its lowest
value for ¢n = n¡2, which is equal to 4(1+°)n2+8(1¡°¡°2)n¡4(3+°+
4°2): It is easy to show that this polynomial in n admits two real roots; for
all ° 2 [0;1], the …rst root is negative, and the second is positive but strictly
inferior to 2, meaning that the polynomial is strictly positive for all ° 2 [0;1]
and n ¸ 2. We have thus proved that -(¢n) > 0 80 · ¢n · n ¡ 2. Since
-(¢n) = -(¡¢n), this also means that -(¢n) > 0 8 ¡ n + 2 · ¢n · 0,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. The …rst step of the proof consists in showing
that for every ¢m, there is a unique value of ¢n such that no downstream
…rm …nds it pro…table to deviate. Conditions (Da) and (Db), combined with
statement (v) of Lemma 1, imply indeed that by varying ¢n from ¡n to n
and imposing equilibrium in the downstream industry, we de…ne an increas-
ing sequence of adjacent non-empty intervals which completely covers the
real line. (The …rst interval is given by [¡1;(m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °))©(¡n + 2)=t],
and the last one by [(m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °))©(n)=t;1]). This means that any
value of ¢m falls in one and only one of these intervals. We can thus de…ne
the non-decreasing function D(¢m) that associates to every ¢m a unique
value of ¢n for which there is equilibrium in the downstream industry.
24Take now ¢m = x0; with x0 < m; and let y0 = D(x0). If the pair (x0;y0)
also meets conditions (Ua) and (Ub), we are done. Otherwise, we have that
either (Ua) or (Ub) is violated. Suppose without loss of generality that (Ub)
is violated, meaning that for ¢n = y0, upstream …rms wish to switch from
brand a to brand b: Consider then x1 = x0+2. We know that y1 = D(x1) ¸
y0: Again, if the pair (x1;y1) meets (Ua) and (Ub), we are done. Otherwise,
we have necessarily that (Ub) is violated. To see this, remember that (Ub)
was violated for (x0;y0); that is, we had x0 < [2(2 ¡ t)=t]ª(y0) ¡ 1, which
is equivalent to x1 = x0 +2 < [2(2 ¡ t)=t]ª(y0)+1 · [2(2 ¡ t)=t]ª(y1)+1
(since y1 ¸ y0 and ª(¢n) is an increasing function of ¢n), which ensures
that (Ua) is met for (x1;y1): In other words, upstream …rms still wish to
switch from brand a to brand b: We can thus repeat the previous procedure.
In the worst-case scenario, this will drive us to xk = m, with a corresponding
yk = D(m) ¸ yk¡1 = D(m ¡ 2): For xk = m, all upstream …rms adopt
brand a. Therefore, equilibrium in the upstream industry only requires that
condition (Ua) be satis…ed. Using our previous argument, we know that this
is necessarily true since condition (Ub) was violated for (xk¡1;yk¡1):
A analog argument applies if, starting from the pair (x0;y0), we assume
instead that condition (Ua) is not met.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) For global concentration to be a brand choice
equilibrium, only conditions (Ua) and (Da) have to be met. With ¢m = m
and ¢n = n; these two conditions translate as:
m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)
t




It is easy to see that second inequality (which ensures no deviation in the
upstream industry) boils down to m · 2=t; which is clearly satis…ed because
of Condition (INT). On the other hand, developing the …rst inequality, we
have
m ¸
m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)
t
4(n ¡ 1)(n ¡ °)
4(1 +°)n2 + 4(3 ¡ °2)n ¡ 4°(1 ¡°)
,
t ¸
(n ¡ 1)(n ¡ °)(1 ¡ °)
n(n + 1)
´ ¹ t(°;n):
(ii) Let ¢n = n and ¢m = x < m: For this to be an equilibrium, condi-
tion (Ub) has to be met, i.e., x ¸ ª(n)[2(2 ¡t)]=t ¡ 1, which is equivalent
to x + 2 ¸ ª(n)[2(2 ¡ t)]=t + 1 = 2=t: This is impossible since we have
25established above that m · 2=t: We have thus proved that there is no equi-
librium with ¢n = n and ¢m = m: However, equilibria with ¢m = m and
¢n < n are possible. For instance, with m = n = 3; ¢m = 3 and ¢n = 1 is
an equilibrium for ° = 0:5 and t = 0:1:
Proof of Proposition 5. Take ¢n = 0. Conditions (Ua) and (Ub) can
be rewritten as ¡1 · ¢m · 1, while conditions (Da) and (Db) boil down to
[m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)] ©(0) · t¢m · [m(2 ¡ t)(1 ¡ °)]©(2). With m even, both
are true only for ¢m = 0 since we know from statement (iv) of Lemma 1
that ©(0) = ¡©(2) < 0: Take now ¢m = 0: We know from Proposition 2
that equilibria are only possible for ¢n ¸ 0. We also know from statement
(iv) of Lemma 1 that, with n even, ©(¢n) > 0 for ¢n > 0. Hence, condition
(Da) can only be met for ¢n = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7. With m and n even, the set S of parame-
ters where global concentration and equal split are equilibria simultane-
ously is de…ned by fm ¸ 2;n ¸ 2;t < 1;0 · ° · 1j t ¸ ¹ t(n;°) =
[(n ¡ 1)(n ¡ °)(1 ¡°)]=[n(n + 1)]g:
(1) Consumer. The demand functions for brands a and b are generated by
a representative consumer who has the following quadratic utility function:
U(Ya;Yb) = Ya + Yb ¡ (1=2)(Y 2
a + Y 2
b ) ¡ °YaYb + Y0, (7)
where Yk (k = a;b) is the quantity of brand k and Y0 the quantity of
numéraire she consumes. We have 0 · ° · 1. Her budget constraint is
R = paYa + pbYb + Y0. Maximizing (7) subject to the budget constraint
yields the linear inverse demand schedule presented in Section 2. Consumer






a + Y 2
b ) + °YaYb.
>From expressions (5) and (6), it is easy to compute the consumer sur-
plus for the cases of global concentration and equal split, respectively as
CS(m;n) =
m2n2
2(m +1)2(n + 1)2,
CS (m=2;n=2) =
m2n2(1 + °)(2 ¡ t)2
4(m +1)2 [n(1 + °) + 2]
2.
26One computes CS(m;n)¡CS (m=2;n=2): This is a quadratic form in t with
two real roots, one of which being larger than 1. Therefore CS(m;n) >
CS (m=2;n=2) if and only if
t > tc(n;°) ´ 2 ¡
[n(1 + °) + 2]
p
2(1 + °)
(n + 1)(1 + °)
.
Some lines of easy but tedious algebra establish that tc(n;°) < ¹ t(n;°); 8n ¸
2; ° 2 [0;1], which proves that the set of parameters where the representative
consumer prefers global concentration to equal split includes S.
(2) Downstream …rms. Using the equilibrium pro…ts derived in Subsec-
tion 4.2, one derives the downstream industry total pro…ts for the cases of
global concentration and equal split, respectively as
¦d(m;n) =
m2n
(m + 1)2(n + 1)2.
¦d (m=2;n=2) =
m2n(2 ¡ t)2
(m + 1)2[n(1 + °) + 2]
2.
It is straightforward to check that ¦d(m;n) > ¦d (m=2;n=2) if and only if




which proves that the set of parameters where downstream …rms prefer
global concentration to equal split is included in S.
(3) Upstream …rms. Using the equilibrium pro…ts derived in Subsection
4.2, one derives the upstream industry total pro…ts for the cases of global






Computing ¦u(m;n) ¡ ¦u (m=2;n=2), we get a quadratic form in t. It
can be shown that this quadratic form has no real root and is negative for
m(m + 2) < 2=[n(1 ¡ °)] (which, given that m ¸ 2 and n ¸ 2 is always
true for ° < 7=8). For m(m + 2) ¸ 2=[n(1 ¡ °)]; we evaluate ¦u(m;n) ¡
¦u (m=2;n=2) at t = ¹ t(n;°) and establish that it is always negative. We
have thus proved that the set of parameters where upstream …rms prefer
global concentration to equal split is included in S.
(4) Total welfare. Total welfare is computed as W ´ CS + ¦d + ¦u:
Numerical simulations show that for t > ¹ t(n;°), we can have W(m;n) >
27W (m=2;n=2) or W(m;n) < W (m=2;n=2): For instance, let m = 2 and
° = 0:96: For n = 2, ¹ t = 0:00693; taking t = 0:007; we have W(m;n) =
0:34568 < W (m=2;n=2) = 0:34862. For n = 6, ¹ t = 0:02400; taking t =
0:025; we have W(m;n) = 0:40916 > W (m=2;n=2) = 0:40711.
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